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VILLANOVA LAW REVIEW
relative economic strengths should be balanced, but rather which forum
should do the balancing. The involvement of the Board in the give-and-
take of negotiation should be less pronounced than its participation in creat-
ing and preserving the stage for bargaining.72 Presuming that an im-
balance of economic power will not be designated unlawful unless it is
gross, it would seem that the Board's determinations that certain economic
bargaining tactics are unfair labor practices should not be limited on re-
view to the substantial evidence test. The balancing of employer-employee
rights should be viewed as a question of law in the broad sense. 73
In view of the fictitious framework the Courts of Appeals are to
work within, the Inter-Collegiate Press decision was progressive and well-
reasoned. While the holding permitting the use of temporary labor was
a victory for the employer, it may nevertheless be of limited value. It
has been suggested that it is difficult and inefficient for an employer to
retain temporary replacements. 74 The impact of the instant case thus
depends upon the validity of this particular observation, as a victory which
allows one to use such an inefficient and difficult device is merely pyrrhic.
Furthermore, if the employer is forced to resort to this type of conduct,
its position is probably already precarious, necessitating its possession of
a powerful weapon to protect itself from severe harm. Since the prevention
of helplessness would clearly seem to be a necessary element in achieving
industrial peace and stability,75 the decision in Inter-Collegiate Press
accorded with the policy of the National Labor Relations Act, and con-
sequently should be viewed as a valuable precedent.
Francis P. Newell
SECURITIES REGULATION - ATTORNEY'S LIABILITY FOR ERRO-
NEOUS OPINION LETTER - NEGLIGENCE STANDARD IS SUFFICIENT
FOR INJUNCTION IN SEC ENFORCEMENT ACTION.
SEC v. Spectrum, Ltd. (2d Cir. 1973)
The Securities and Exchange Commission (SEC) sought injunctive
relief against twelve participants in a partially successful scheme to dis-
tribute unregistered shares of stock' in violation of the registration and
antifraud provisions of the Securities Act of 1933 (Securities Act) 2 and
72. See Oberer, supra note 26, at 499.
73. See American Ship Bldg. Co. v. NLRB, 380 U.S. 300, 318 (1965); NLRB v.
Brown, 380 U.S. 278, 292 (1965).
74. See, e.g., 486 F.2d at 846 n.14; Note, The Unanswered Questions of American
Ship, 64 MIcH. L. REV. 910, 915 (1966).
75. See note 63 supra.
1. SEC v. Spectrum, Ltd., 489 F.2d 535, 537 (2d Cir. 1973).
2. Section 5 of the Securities Act of 1933 [hereinafter Securities Act], 15 U.S.C.
§ 77e (1970), generally provides that a registration statement must be in effect before
a security may be offered or sold to the public, unless the security is exempted from
registration according to section 3 of the Securities Act, id. § 77c, or the transaction
involved is exempted under section 4 of the Securities Act, id. § 77d. See notes 4 & 10
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the antifraud provisions of the Securities Exchange Act of 1934 (Exchange
Act).3 A merger of Westward Investment Corporation (Westward) into
Spectrum, Ltd. (Spectrum) was planned in order to effectuate a public
distribution of Spectrum securities without filing a registration statement
as mandated by section 5 of the Securities Act.4 First, Westward share-
holders were to be issued, by virtue of the merger, unregistered common
infra. Section 7 of the Securities Act, 15 U.S.C. § 77g (1970), states what information
is required to be set forth in the registration statement, and the SEC has promulgated
Form S-1, 17 C.F.R. § 239.11 (1973), to be used by issuing parties as a means of
satisfying the requirements of that section.
The antifraud provision of the Securities Act is contained in section 17(a),
15 U.S.C. § 77q(a) (1970). That section provides:
It shall be unlawful for any person in the offer or sale of any securities by
the use of any means or instruments of transportation or communication in inter-
state commerce or by the use of the mails, directly or indirectly-(1) to employ any device, scheme, or artifice to defraud, or
(2) to obtain any money or property by means of any untrue statement of a
material fact or any omission to state a material fact necessary in order
to make the statements made, in the light of the circumstances under
which they were made, not misleading, or
(3) to engage in any transaction, practice, or course of business which oper-
ates or would operate as a fraud or deceit upon the purchaser.Id.
3. Rule 10b-5, 17 C.F.R. § 240.10b-5 (1973), was promulgated under section
10(b) of the Securities Exchange Act of 1934 [hereinafter Exchange Act], 15 U.S.C.
§ 78j (b) (1970). Rule 10b-5 states:
It shall be unlawful for any person, directly or indirectly, by the use of any
means or instrumentality of interstate commerce, or of the mails or of any facility
of any national securities exchange,
(a) To employ any device, scheme, or artifice to defraud,
(b) To make any untrue statement of a material fact or to omit to state a
material fact necessary in order to make the statements made, in the
light of the circumstances under which they were made, not misleading, or
(c) To engage in any act, practice, or course of business which operates or
would operate as a fraud or deceit upon any person,
in connection with the purchase or sale of any security.
Id.
4. Section 5 of the Securities Act provides in pertinent part:
(a) Unless a registration statement is in effect as to a security, it shall be
unlawful for any person, directly or indirectly-
(1) to make use of any means or instruments of transportation or com-
munication in interstate commerce or of the mails to sell such security
through the use of medium of any prospectus or otherwise; or
(2) to carry or cause to be carried through the mails or in interstate
commerce, by any means or instruments of transportation, any such
security for the purpose of sale or for delivery after sale.
(c) It shall be unlawful for any person, directly or indirectly, to make use
of any means or instruments of transportation or communication in inter-
state commerce or of the mails to offer to sell or offer to buy through the
use or medium of any prospectus or otherwise any security, unless a
registration statement has been filed as to such security, or while the
registration statement is the subject of a refusal order or stop order or
(prior to the effective date of the registration statement) any public
proceeding or examination under section 77h of this title.
15 U.S.C. § 77e(a), (c) (1970).
"Security" is defined in section 2(1) of the Securities Act, id. § 77b(1).
There was no contention in the instant case that the Spectrum securities were not
"securities" for purposes of the Securities Act, or that they were exempted under
section 3, id. § 77c.
While section 5 states that its provisions are applicable to "any person,"
section 4 of the Securities Act, id. § 77d, provides that section 5 shall not apply to
persons other than issuers, underwriters, or dealers. Although not relevant here,
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stock of Spectrum, 5 such stock being exempted from the section 5 regis-
tration requirement by the SEC's rule 133.6 If the recipient of the un-
registered shares were not an issuer,7 underwriter,8 or dealer 9 he would then
be able to sell them, again without an otherwise-required registration.'
Marder, a controlling shareholder of Westward, distributed his 1,000,000
shares of Westward stock to friends as holders in name only, intending
this ruse to enable him to sell the Spectrum shares received in the merger
without registration."
Spectrum's general counsel Berger issued an opinion letter stating that
the merger complied with all rule 133 requirements, and naming the re-
cipients who should receive only "restricted" (not for public sale) shares, 12
issuers and dealers are afforded additional exemptions as well. Id. § 77d(2), (3).
See notes 7-9 and accompanying text infra.
The terms "sale," "sell," "offers to sell," "offers for sale," and "offer" are
defined in section 2(3) of the Securities Act, 15 U.S.C. § 77b(3). The SEC has
struggled with the question of whether the issuing of securities to shareholders of the
acquired company as the result of a merger, as in the instant case, constitutes a "sale"
for purposes of section 5. See note 6 and accompanying text infra.
5. 489 F.2d at 538.
6. Rule 133 provided that the exchange of shares between the surviving cor-
poration and the stockholders of the disappearing corporation in a merger would not
be considered a "sale." 17 C.F.R. § 230.133 (1973). Rule 133 was rescinded effective
January 1, 1973, 37 Fed. Reg. 23,636 (1972), and has been replaced by rule 145
which does not allow the same registration exemption, deeming such an exchange a
"sale of securities." 17 C.F.R. § 230.145 (1973).
7. "Issuer" is defined in section 2(4) of the Securities Act to be, with certain
exceptions, any entity which issues or proposes to issue any security. 15 U.S.C.
§ 77b(4) (1970).
8. Section 2 defines "underwriter" as follows:
The term "underwriter" means any person who has purchased from an issuer
with a view to, or offers or sells for an issuer in connection with, the distribution
of any security, or participates or has a direct or indirect participation in any
such undertaking, or participates or has a participation in the direct or indirect
underwriting of any such undertaking; but such term shall not include a person
whose interest is limited to a commission from an underwriter or dealer not in
excess of the usual and customary distributors' or sellers' commission. As used
in this paragraph the term "issuer" shall include, in addition to an issuer, any
person directly or indirectly controlling or controlled by the issuer, or any person
under direct or indirect common control with the issuer.
Id. § 77b(11). SEC Securities Act Release No. 5223 (Jan. 11, 1972) (adoption of rule
144) explains the definition of "underwriter" contained in section 2(11), drawing
special attention to the fact that the language used is in the disjunctive; so for one
to fall within only one of the enumerated categories is sufficient to qualify one as
an underwriter.
9. See section 2(12) of the Securities Act, 15 U.S.C. § 77b(12) (1970), for
the definition of "dealer."
10. Since section 4(1), id. § 77d(1), states that section 5 shall not apply to trans-
actions by persons "other than issuers, underwriters, and dealers," a person not fall-
ing into one of those categories does not violate section 5 when he sells unregistered
shares. It should be noted, however, that "underwriter" is broadly defined and en-
compasses persons not included in the familiar use of the term. See note 8 supra.
11. 498 F.2d at 538. If Marder had offered to sell the Spectrum securities him-
self, he would have been deemed an underwriter under rule 133(c), and, therefore,
the shares subsequently offered would not have been exempted from the registration
requirement of section 5.
12. The term "restricted securities" is defined in SEC rule 144 as "securities
acquired directly or indirectly from the issuer thereof, or an affiliate of such issuer, in
a transaction or chain of transactions not involving any public offering." 17 C.F.R.
§ 230.144(a) (3) (1973). If a person sells restricted securities, he will not be deemed
an underwriter for purposes of determining a section 5 violation, provided he meets
all the conditions set forth in rule 144.
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being underwriters under rule 133.13 Berger later wrote a second letter,
not in the form of an opinion letter, listing everyone who had received
unrestricted shares in the merger. 14 Subsequently, Schiffman, an attorney
relying on the Berger letters, but allegedly without any previous involve-
ment or information about the transactions, composed an opinion letter for
a nominal owner of some of the Marder shares advising him that he could
sell the shares. 15 On these facts, the SEC obtained permanent injunctions
against most of the defendants, including Spectrum and Marder.' 6 With
respect to Schiffman, the United States District Court for the Southern
District of New York concluded that there were no material facts in dis-
pute, despite the fact that contradictory affidavits had been filed by Schiffman
and the broker-dealer who had hired him, and accordingly denied the
SEC's motion for an evidentiary hearing and preliminary injunction.' 7
In addition, the district court indicated that Schiffman's conduct, even if
negligent, had not amounted to a violation of the securities laws.' 8 The
United States Court of Appeals for the Second Circuit reversed and re-
manded the case for an evidentiary hearing on the factual issues, holding
that it was error for the lower court to have decided such a case where
there were material facts in dispute 9 and that the negligent conduct of an
attorney in the preparation of an opinion letter in conjunction with a public
distribution of unregistered securities may give rise to a violation of the
securities laws for purposes of an SEC enforcement action. Securities and
Exchange Commission v. Spectrum, Ltd., 489 F.2d 535 (2d Cir. 1973).
Three methods exist for taking action against an attorney for a
violation of the federal securities laws. The first is an SEC disciplinary
proceeding under rule 2(e) of the Commission's Rules of Practice," which
allows the SEC to suspend or disbar anyone from practice before it for
committing or aiding and abetting in the commission of a violation of any
securities law provision.21 The second method is a private action for dam-
13. 498 F.2d at 538. See note 11 supra.
14. 498 F.2d at 538.
15. Id. at 539.
16. SEC v. Spectrum, Ltd., 54 F.R.D. 70 (S.D.N.Y. 1972).
17. SEC v. Spectrum, Ltd., [1972-1973 Transfer Binder] CCH FED. SEC. L. REP.
1 93,631 (S.D.N.Y. 1972).
18. Id. at 92,868. The SEC alleged that Schiffman was an underwriter of the
Spectrum distribution and, therefore, was not protected by the section 4(1) exemption
from the registration requirements of section 5. Furthermore, the SEC claimed that
Schiffman was an aider and abettor of the entire scheme. Id. at 92,867-68. See
notes 26 & 27 infra.
19. The primary factual issue in dispute was the extent of Schiffman's actual
knowledge of the scheme. 489 F.2d at 540-41.
20. 17 C.F.R. § 201.2(e) (1973).
21. Id. Actions under rule 2(e) may be divided into four historical periods: 1)prior to 1950; no actions were brought; 2) 1950-1959: only four disciplinary actions
were brought, all for intentional and flagrant violations; 3) 1960-1969: extensive
use was made of the rule, but only for intentional violations; 4) 1970-present: con-
tinued extensive use was made of the rule, but not exclusively for intentional violations.
Comment, SEC Disciplinary Rules and the Federal Security Laws: The Regulation,
Role and Responsibilities of the Attorney, 1972 DUKE L.J. 969, 982-85 (1972).
JUNE 1974]
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ages for violation of the Securities Act2 and the Exchange Act.23 The
third, used in the instant case, is an SEC enforcement action via a
civil injunction. 24 Of these proceedings, the private action for damages
has been the most widely utilized, although often requiring proof of a
higher degree of culpability than others. 25 For an attorney such as
Schiffman who has merely prepared an opinion letter - a necessary step
in the public distribution of unregistered securities - erroneously, the
theory of culpability under each of these approaches may apply to him in
his role as an underwriter in the distribution,26 or as an aider and abettor
of those who actually committed the violations. 27
22. Several provisions of the Securities Act provide express private rights of
action for damages resulting from violations of various provisions of the act. E.g.,
section 12 of the Securities Act, 15 U.S.C. § 77j (1970) (purchaser of a security
offered in violation of section 5 may recover damages from seller). Other sections,
while not literally granting a private right of action, have been interpreted as per-
mitting such. For example, section 17 of the Securities Act (see note 2 supra), its
general antifraud provision, has been construed as allowing a private party to sue
for damages resulting from violations thereof. See L. Loss, SECURITIES REGULATION
1784-89 (2d ed. 1961).
23. Section 9(e), 15 U.S.C. § 78i(e) (1970), gives an express private right to
sue for damages resulting from activities designed to create the appearance of active
trading in any security registered on a national exchange.
An example of a section of the Exchange Act that has been interpreted as
granting an implied private right of action is section 10(b) and, promulgated there-
under, rule lOb-5 (see note 3 supra), which has continually been utilized in private
damage actions and represents the most frequently invoked provisions of the securities
laws. See generally 2 A. BROMBERG, SECURITIES LAWS: FRAUD ch. 8 (1973).
Another remedy which may exist as a private action, in conjunction with
the second method mentioned, is an action for tortious misconduct under the second
RESTATEMENT OF TORTS, section 552, which imposes liability for misrepresentation
without a fraud requirement:
One who, in the course of his business, profession or employment, or in a trans-
action in which he has a pecuniary interest, supplies false information for the
guidance of others in their business transactions, is subject to liability for pecuniary
loss caused to them by their justifiable reliance upon the information, if he fails
to exercise reasonable care or competence in obtaining or communicating the
information.
RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 552 (Tent. Draft No. 12, 1966).
24. Section 20 of the Securities Act, 15 U.S.C. § 77t (1970), and section 21 of
the Exchange Act, id. § 78u, permit the SEC to enjoin acts and practices in violation
of the respective act.
25. See text accompanying notes 32-47 infra, regarding the degree of involve-
ment and culpability required by the various federal circuits.
26. For the statutory definition of underwriter, see note 8 supra. The Second
Circuit has defined the term "underwriter" to include:
[A]nyone who directly or indirectly participates in a distribution of securities
from an "issuer" to the public; and for this purpose the term "issuer" is defined
to include not only the issuer but also affiliates or subsidiaries of the issuer and
"any person directly or indirectly controlling or controlled by the issuer, or any
person under direct or indirect common control with the issuer.
SEC v. North Am. Res. & Dev. Corp., 424 F.2d 63, 72 (2d Cir. 1970).
In the instant case, the SEC argued that Schiffman was an underwriter
because he had had "a direct or indirect participation" in the distribution of the
Spectrum securities. [1972-1973 Transfer Binder] CCH FED. SEC. L. REP. 1 93,631,
at 92,867. The district court held that he had not been an underwriter because there
was no evidence that any Spectrum stock had been sold on the basis of Schiffman's
letter. Id. The Second Circuit declined to resolve this issue "[b]ecause the record
[was] unclear . . . ." 489 F.2d at 541 n.ll. Had the court determined that he had
in fact been an underwriter, Schiffman would clearly have been in violation of section 5.
See note 4 supra.
27. Although section 17 of the Securities Act, section 10(b) of the Exchange
Act, and rule lOb-5 are phrased in terms of "any person," (see notes 2 & 3 supra),
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The standard which has been applied to determine whether one's
-conduct qualifies as aiding and abetting is that formula set out in the
Restatement of Torts section 876.28 The plaintiff has the burden of showing
that the principals committed the violation and that the aider-abettor sub-
stantially assisted them. Additionally, it must be demonstrated that the
aider-abettor acted affirmatively, or failed to act when there existed a legal
duty to act, and that the aider-abettor knowingly participated in the fraud.
29
Hence, in order to apply this test, one must first be satisfied that plaintiff
has established the requisite degree of participation by the attorney. Then,
a determination must be made as to whether scienter30 is a prerequisite, or
whether mere negligence will suffice to impose liability under this theory.
31
in practice those sections have been invoked only against individuals who fit within
any of four categories: 1) insiders, i.e., those who because of their relationship to the
issuer have access to facts not available to the general public, 2) broker-dealers, 3)
the corporation whose stock was brought or sold by the plaintiff, and 4) those who
conspire with or aid and abet a person within one of the other three categories.
Comment, The SEC and The Securities Bar: Adversaries or Allies?, 23 CATH. U.L.
REv. 122, 125 (1973).
In the instant case, the SEC alleged that Schiffman was either an underwriter
or an aider and abettor of the illegal scheme. See note 19 supra. Presumably, the
SEC believed that Schiffman was not in direct violation of section 17, section 10b,
or rule lOb-5 as an insider, broker-dealer, or issuer.
The leading case establishing the principle that liability in a securities fraud
suit may be imposed upon a secondary participant for aiding and abetting is Brennan
v. Midwestern United Life Ins. Co., 417 F.2d 147 (7th Cir. 1969), cert. denied, 397
U.S. 989 (1970). See 2 A. BROMBERG, supra note 23, at §§ 8.5(515), 8.5(530) ; Ruder,
Multiple Defendants in Securities Law Fraud Cases: Aiding and Abetting, Con-
spiracy, In Pari Delicto, Indemnification, and Contribution, 120 U. PA. L. REv. 597,
628-30 (1972).
28. RESTATEMENT OF TORTS § 876 (1939). See 50 TEXAS L. REv. 1265, 1269-70
(1972), and the cases cited therein.
29. 50 TEXAS L. REv. at 1269.
30. "Scienter" has been defined as:
Knowingly. [D]efendant's previous knowledge of a state of facts which it was
his duty to guard against, and his omission to do which has led to the injury
complained of.
BLACK'S LAW DICTIONARY 1512 (rev. 4th ed. 1968).
31. An attorney's negligence may be measured by a "reasonable man" standard,
or by a due diligence test of whether or not after a reasonable investigation on the
attorney's part, he had reasonable grounds to believe that the facts as presented were
true and he did believe them to be so. Comment, Securities and Exchange Commission
v. National Student Marketing: The Attorney's Duty, 46 TEMP. L.Q. 153, 156-57
(1972).
The SEC view of the obligation of counsel to investigate before writing an
opinion letter is expressed in the following lengthy quotation from a release on un-
registered securities:
There have been a number of cases in which dealers have unsuccessfully
sought to justify a claim of exemption under Section 4(1) of the Securities Act
simply by securing from the sellers, actual or ostensible, representations that such
persons are neither officers, directors, nor large stockholders of the issuer, and
submitting such representations to an attorney who then gives an opinion to the
effect that, assuming the correctness of such representations, exemption under
Section 4(1) is available. Obviously, an attorney's opinion based upon hypo-
thetical facts is worthless if the facts are not as specified, or if unspecified but
vital facts are not considered. Because of this, it is the practice of responsible
counsel not to furnish an opinion concerning the availability of an exemption
from registration under the Securities Act for a contemplated distribution unless
JUNE 1974]
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Looking to the decisions of the other circuits for guidance as to what
degree of fault is necessary to impose liability for damages resulting from
violations of the antifraud provisions is not especially helpful, for there is
little consistency in their decisional law. The Tenth Circuit has most
clearly supported a negligence standard. 2 Recently that circuit twice applied
its negligence standard by shifting the burden of proof to the defendant
to prove that neither did he know, nor could he have known through the
exercise of reasonable care, of the alleged misrepresentation. 33 While it
has expressed support of a negligence standard only in dicta,3 4 in City
National Bank v. Vanderboont,35 the Eighth Circuit specifically stated
that it disagreed with the Second Circuit insofar as the latter court would
not accept a negligence test.36 Although the Ninth Circuit has also stated in
dicta that scienter is not a prerequisite for a private action for damages,3 7
the existence of scienter had actually been established in each of the Ninth
Circuit cases, because all of the defendants involved had had actual knowl-
edge.38 The Seventh Circuit has expressed approval of a negligence standard
such counsel have themselves carefully examined all of the relevant circumstances
and satisfied themselves, to the extent possible, that the contemplated transaction
is, in fact, not a part of an unlawful distribution. Indeed, if an attorney furnishes
an opinion based solely upon hypothetical facts which he has made no effort to
verify, and if he knows that his opinion will be relied upon as the basis for a
substantial distribution of unregistered securities, a serious question arises as to
the propriety of his professional conduct.
SEC Securities Act Release No. 4445 (Feb. 2, 1962).
32. Stevens v. Vowell, 343 F.2d 374, 379-80 (10th Cir. 1965) (rule lob-5 suit
to recover amount paid for purchase of stock).
33. The court equated the phrase "reasonable care" with "due diligence." See
Mitchell v. Texas Gulf Sulphur Co., 446 F.2d 90, 102 (10th Cir.), cert. denied, 404
U.S. 1004 (1971) (stockholders' rule lob-5 suit against insiders for damages);
Gilbert v. Nixon, 429 F.2d 348, 357 (10th Cir. 1970) (securities purchaser's rule
lOb-5 suit against issuer for damages). For a view in support of shifting the burden
of proof, see Comment, Scienter in Private Damage Actions Under Rule 10b-5, 57
GEo. L.J. 1108, 1115-17 (1969).
34. See Myzel v. Fields, 386 F.2d 718, 738-39 (8th Cir. 1967) (stock sellers' rule
10b-5 suit against purchasing insiders for damages), cert. denied, 390 U.S. 951 (1968).
35. 422 F.2d 221 (8th Cir.) (rule 10b-5 suit for damages), cert. denied, 399
U.S. 905 (1970).
36. 422 F.2d at 229-30. See notes 41-48 and accompanying text infra.
37. Hecht v. Harris, Upham & Co., 430 F.2d 1202, 1209 (9th Cir. 1970) (rule
10b-5 suit for damages) ; Royal Air Properties, Inc. v. Smith, 312 F.2d 210, 212 (9th
Cir. 1962) (stock purchaser's rule 10b-5 suit for damages) ; Ellis v. Carter, 291 F.2d
270, 274 (9th Cir. 1961) (stock buyer's damage suit under sections 12(2), 17(a) and
rule lOb-5).
38. The Ninth Circuit recently clarified its position on the scienter requirement
by reiterating its rejection of a fraud standard and establishing a "flexible duty" rule
which does not depend upon a strict finding of scienter or causation. White v.
Abrams, 495 F.2d 724, 734-36 (9th Cir. 1974). The court stated:
In this circuit, we have never adhered to the requirement of scienter in the
common law fraud sense. While we did not apply liability without fault, our
language in Ellis and Royal Air was apparently construed by the district court
to create such a standard. Such a construction is erroneous. It is also erroneous
to construe those cases as imposing a negligence standard or any other standard
that focuses solely upon state of mind and its various compartmentalizations. We
believe that the cases and commentators demonstrate that any attempt to limit the
scope of duty in all 10b-5 cases by the use of one standard for state of mind or
scienter is confusing and unworkable. Consequently, we reject scienter or any
[VOL. 19
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without regard to scienter, but only in a case primarily concerned with the
applicable statute of limitations for a securities law violation.Y9 Both the
Third and Fifth Circuits have required the presence of fraud without
defining what constituted culpably fraudulent conduct.40
The Second Circuit has been the setting for most of the litigation in
the area of securities law violations; it has also been the most conservative
in granting relief, particularly in private actions. In 1971, the court in
Shemtob v. Shearson, Hamill & Co. 41 emphasized the need for a showing
of scienter. 42 Shemtob involved a rule lOb-5 suit against a brokerage
firm for failing to sell out the plaintiffs' account promptly and for eventually
selling out their account without providing an opportunity to post addi-
tional margin.43 The circuit court affirmed the district court's dismissal
for failure to state a cause of action, stating:
[P] laintiff's claim is nothing more than a garden-variety customer's suit
against a broker for breach of contract, which cannot be bootstrapped
into an alleged violation of § 10(b) of the Exchange Act, or Rule
lOb-5, in the absence of allegation of facts amounting to scienter, intent
to defraud, reckless disregard for the truth, or knowing use of a device,
scheme or artifice to defraud. It is insufficient to allege mere negli-
gence, . . . breach of contract or breach of a stock exchange rule .... 44
In Lanza v. Drexel,45 the Second Circuit reiterated that Shemtob had re-
moved any question that scienter was required in private actions in that
circuit.4 6 However, the Lanza court did state that the negligence standard
for liability was permissible in SEC enforcement actions.4 7
other discussion of state of mind as a necessary and separate element of a lOb-5
action. The proper standard to be applied is the extent of the duty that rule 10b-5
imposes on this particular defendant. In making this determination the court
should focus on the goals of the securities fraud legislation by considering a
number of factors that have been found to be significant in securities transactions.
Id. at 734-35 (footnotes omitted). The factors that the court considered would be
relevant in defining this duty were:
the relationship of the defendant to the plaintiff, the defendant's access to the
information as compared to the plaintiff's access, the benefit that the defendant
derives from the relationship, the defendant's awareness of whether the plaintiff
was relying upon their relationship in making his investment decisions and the
defendant's activity in initiating the securities transaction in question.
Id. at 735-36 (footnotes omitted).
39. Parrent v. Midwest Rug Mills, Inc., 455 F.2d 123, 126 (7th Cir. 1972) (stock
purchasers' section 17(a) and rule lOb-5 suit for damages).
40. Landy v. FDIC, 486 F.2d 139, 160-61 (3d Cir. 1973), cert. denied, 416 U.S.
960 (1974) (insolvent bank's shareholders' rule lOb-5 suit for damages against bank
president for misuse of bank funds) ; Kohn v. American Metal Climax, Inc., 458 F.2d
255, 269 (3d Cir.), cert. denied, 409 U.S. 874 (1972) (shareholders rule lob-5 suit
for damages resulting from misleading proxy statements) ; Herpich v. Wallace, 430
F.2d 792 (5th Cir. 1970) (stockholders rule 10b-5 suit for damages).
41. 448 F.2d 442 (2d Cir. 1971).
42. Id. at 445.
43. Id. at 444.
44. Id. at 445.
45. 479 F.2d 1277 (2d Cir. 1973) (en banc) (stock purchasers' section 17(a)
and rule lOb-5 suit for damages).
46. Id. at 1304.
47. Id. See also SEC v. Manor Nursing Centers, Inc., 458 F.2d 1082, 1096 n.15(2d Cir. 1972).
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The instant case was remanded for a factual determination on the
negligence issue.48 The court noted that had the injunction been denied
merely due to the failure to demonstrate a propensity for future violations
on the basis of SEC v. Bangor Punta Corp.,49 the decision might not have
been disturbed.5 ° It was the district court's disregard of the existence of
a factual dispute evidenced by the conflicting affidavits as to the extent
of Schiffman's involvement that mandated the remand here.," Citing SEC
v. Manor Nursing Centers, Inc.,52 Hanly v. SEC,5 3 and SEC v. Texas
Gulf Sulphur Co.,54 the court indicated that the appropriate standard to
be applied in an enforcement proceeding seeking prophylactic relief was one
of negligence, predicated in the instant case upon an aiding and abetting
theory. 5
Texas Gulf Sulphur is a leading case, having established the rule that
[i]n an enforcement proceeding for equitable or prophylactic relief,
the common law standard of deceptive conduct has been modified in
the interests of broader protection for the investing public so that
negligent insider conduct has become unlawful.5 6
The instant court used this language to support Schiffman's liability for
negligence as an aider and abettor, not as an insider as was the case in
Texas Gulf Sulphur ;57 therefore, viewing this language within Texas Gulf
Sulphur's narrow factual setting, the quotation is not wholly apposite to
Spectrum. Yet it would appear that a negligent aider and abettor in this
situation should not be treated differently from the negligent insider himself
if the objective in each case is to broaden protection for the investing public.
In addition, Texas Gulf Sulphur's theme of "protection for the investing
48. 489 F.2d at 537.
49. 331 F. Supp. 1154 (S.D.N.Y. 1971), aff'd sub nom. Chris-Craft Indus., Inc.
v. Piper Aircraft Corp., 480 F.2d 341, 393-95 (2d Cir.), cert. denied, 414 U.S. 924
(1973). Bangor Punta placed the burden upon the Commission to establish by per-
suasive evidence that defendant had a propensity or natural inclination to violate
securities laws. 480 F.2d at 1162-63.
50. 489 F.2d at 540. The court did indicate, however, that it would not exclude
from evidence the fact that Schiffman previously had been enjoined for securities laws
violations twice, and had pleaded guilty to a third such violation. Id. at 542. Such
evidence may be indicative of a propensity to commit further securities laws violations.
51. Id. at 540, citing Dopp v. Franklin Nat'l Bank, 461 F.2d 873, 879 (2d Cir.
1972) (evidentiary hearing deemed essential for resolving a credibility gap over a dis-
pute as to the occurrence of crucial events) ; quoting Sims v. Greene, 161 F.2d 87, 88,
(3d Cir. 1947).
52. 458 F.2d 1082 (2d Cir. 1972).
53. 415 F.2d 589 (2d Cir. 1969).
54. 401 F.2d 833 (2d Cir. 1968) (en banc), cert. denied, 394 U.S. 976 (1969).
55. 489 F.2d at 541. The court acknowledged that Schiffman's status as an under-
writer was uncertain. Id. However, liability as an underwriter was and remains a
strong possibility here, considering the nexus between Schiffman's role of writing the-
necessary opinion letter and the stock distribution. See notes 8 & 26 supra.
56. 401 F.2d at 854-55 (citations omitted; emphasis added).
57. The defendants in Texas Gulf Sulphur were officers and employees of the
company who purchased stock of the company without disclosing to the sellers material
inside information concerning mineral exploration results which would have influenced
the decision to sell. Id. at 839-47.
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public" via the Securities and Exchange Acts 5 has been approved by the
Supreme Court. The Court stated in SEC v. Capital Gains Research
Bureau Inc.,59 that the provisions against fraud were to be construed "not
technically and restrictively, but flexibly to effectuate [their] remedial
purposes." 60
In the second case cited by the Spectrum court, Hanly v. SEC, the
Second Circuit imposed a duty on brokers and salesmen to investigate the
validity of representations made by the issuer concerning the securities
that the broker-dealer is offering, and, in the context of an SEC action
to revoke the broker-dealer's registration, defined a violation of that duty
as one involving willful misconduct.6 ' The Hanly court expressed a belief
that a "securities dealer occupies a special relationship to a buyer of
securities in that by his position he implicitly represents he has an adequate
basis for the opinions he renders. ' ' 62 The analogy to the position of trust
occupied by an attorney is clear.63
Third, in SEC v. Manor Nursing Centers, Inc., the defendant-attorney's
contention that good faith should preclude liability under the antifraud
provisions of the federal securities laws was rejected as a defense by the
Second Circuit, since a violation of the securities laws did not require all
the elements essential to common law fraud. 64 Therefore, if Schiffman
had raised a defense of good faith reliance upon the Berger letters, he
would have failed on the defense by authority of Hanly and Manor Nursing
Centers.65 Thus the Spectrum court, in stating that it did not believe the
58. The Texas Gulf Sulphur court also stated:
[Tihe implementation of a standard of conduct that encompasses negligence as
well as active fraud comports with the administrative and legislative purposes
underlying [rule 10b-5].
Id. at 855 (footnote omitted).
59. 375 U.S. 180 (1963).
60. Id. at 195. See Tcherepnin v. Knight, 389 U.S. 332, 336 (1967). In discussing
Rule lob-5 in Affiliated Ute Citizens of Utah v. United States, 406 U.S. 128, rehearing
denied, 407 U.S. 916, 408 U.S. 931 (1972), the Court said that "[t]hese proscriptions,
by statute and rule, are broad and, by repeated use of the word 'any,' are obviously
meant to be inclusive." 406 U.S. at 151. See generally H.R. REP. No. 85, 73d Cong.,
1st Sess. (1933); H.R. REP, No. 1382, 73d Cong., 2d Sess. (1934), for the legislative
histories of the Securities Act and of the Exchange Act, respectively.
61. 415 F.2d at 595-96.
62. Id. at 596.
63. See note 31 supra.
64. 458 F.2d at 1096, quoting Globus v. Law Res. Serv., Inc., 418 F.2d 1276,
1290-91 (2d Cir. 1969). The SEC sought injunctive relief, alleging violations of sec-
tions 5(b) (2) and 17(a) of the Securities Act and section 10(b) of the Exchange
Act, arising from the sale of newly issued securities. Essentially, the defendants failed
to conform to the terms of the offering, as contained in the registration statement, that
any funds received through the sale would be returned to the purchasers if two con-
ditions were not met by a specified date: (1) the entire offering was purchased; and
(2) all proceeds from such sales were received. 458 F.2d at 1088-94. The defendant-
attorney prepared all the necessary documents, including the registration statement,
and was directly involved in the sale of the securities. Id.
65. The court in Manor Nursing Centers pointed out that the defendant's back-
ground as an experienced securities lawyer belied his claim of good faith. rd. at
1096-97. Considering Schiffman's past experience with SEC injunctions (see note 50
supra), that consideration may be applicable in the proceedings on remand in the instant
case as well.
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imposition of a negligence standard for secondary parties in the instant
case was too strict, was consistent with the trend of the case law to greatly
expand attorneys' liability.66
The following three cases are particularly indicative of this trend to
expand attorneys' liability, and although the latest of the three awaits reso-
lution by the courts, they nevertheless give a firm indication of the SEC's
idea of the proper application of the securities law provisions in this area:
In 1968, the SEC in SEC v. Frank,07 sought injunctive relief against an
attorney for his participation in the preparation of an allegedly misleading
offering circular. 8 The SEC's position was that the attorney had been
furnished with information that even a nonexpert would suspect contained
false representations.6 9 The Second Circuit agreed, stating that "no more
than others" could a lawyer "escape liability for fraud by closing his eyes
to what he saw and could readily understand. ' 70
Second, the duty of an attorney to investigate the accuracy of the
registration statement was explicitly described in Escott v. BarChris Con-
structidn Corp.71 In that case, two attorney-directors, among others, were
held liable under section 1172 for damages resulting from a false and mis-
leading registration statement.7 3 In finding the attorneys liable as directors
of the issuer for their having signed the false registration statement, 74 the
66. 489 F.2d at 541. Recently, commentators have supported that belief. For
example:
Since there is no reason to lower the standard of care from that applied in a non-
securities law context, an attorney should at least be held responsible to the client
for whom he prepares a legal opinion as to the due issuance of securities or the
nonapplicability of the 1933 Act if he acts negligently ....
When an attorney knows that his opinion is being utilized to effect a sale of
securities unlawful under the 1933 Act, or does not undertake the inquiry necessary
to permit him to express an honest and informed opinion that the sale is exempt
from registration, or is in possession of facts which would cause a prudent lawyer
to make further inquiry, or otherwise acts in a reckless manner, his degree of
culpability may suggest that the balance be struck in favor of holding him liable
to a larger class of plaintiffs.
Small, An Attorney's Responsibilities Under Federal and State Securities Laws:
Private Counselor or Public Servant?, 61 CAL. L. REv. 1189, 1197-98 (1973).
67. 388 F.2d 486 (2d Cir. 1968).
68. The SEC alleged that the offering circular contained misleading statements
in violation of section 17(a) of the Securities Act and section 10(b) of the Exchange
Act, and sought to enjoin the attorney from drafting any documents containing untrue
statements or omissions which would make the document appear not to be misleading.
Id. at 487.
69. Id. at 489.
70. Id.
71. 283 F. Supp. 643, 690 (S.D.N.Y. 1968).
72. 15 U.S.C. § 77k (1970). Section 11 expressly permits a person acquiring a
security to sue, inter alia, every person who signed the registration statement, and
every person who was or was about to become a director, for damages, if the registra-
tion statement contained false or misleading statements at the time it became effective.
Id. § 77k(a). Each of the persons liable under this section is provided a "due dili-
gence" defense which generally allows no recovery against the defendant if "he had,
after reasonable investigation, reasonable ground to believe, and did believe" that the
registration statement was accurate. Id. § 77k(b) (3).
73. 283 F. Supp. at 687, 692.
74. 15 U.S.C. § 77k(a) (2) (1970). See note 72 supra.
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court utilized a test which placed upon them a duty to investigate the truth
of the financial statement more thoroughly than nonattorney directors.7 5
However, it was in SEC v. National Student Marketing Corp.76
(NSMC), which is still pending final resolution, that the SEC sought to
impose the greatest duty upon attorneys in the securities law field. In this
action, the SEC charged two established law firms77 and several of their
respective partners individually with failing to disclose material financial
information received from an accounting firm prior to closing a merger. 78
The SEC maintained that the law firms should have refused to issue the
misleading opinion letters, and should have insisted that the incorrect
financial statement be revised and the shareholders resolicited. If such
advice had been ignored, the SEC claimed, the attorneys should have stop-
ped representing their clients and informed the SEC of the misleading
transaction.79 Thus, it was this attempt to charge the attorney with a
"policeman" role which was the most novel aspect of this complaint, for
75. With respect to one of the attorneys who was an "outside" director (not an
officer of the issuer), the court stated:
After making all due allowances for the fact that [the issuer's] officers misled
him, there are too many instances in which [the attorney] failed to make an in-
quiry which he could easily have made which, if pursued, would have put him on
his guard. In my opinion, this finding on the evidence in this case does not
establish an unreasonably high standard in other cases for company counsel who
are also directors.
283 F. Supp. at 692. Concerning the second director-attorney, who was also an officer,
the court believed that "[a]s a lawyer, he should have known his obligations under
the statute. He should have known that he was required to make a reasonable investi-
gation of the truth of all the statements in the unexpertised portion of the document
which he signed." Id. at 687.
Compare these standards to that applied to the nonattorney, outside director:
"He can escape liability only by using that reasonable care to investigate the facts
which a prudent man would employ in the management of his own property." Id.
at 688. Clearly, then, the director was held to a duty to conduct a more thorough
investigation due his position as an attorney. As one commentator noted, in the Bar
Chris case, "The lawyer-director was the only outside director cited for failing to
examine written records." Comment, Bar Chris: Easing the Burden of "Due Dili-
gence" Under Section 11, 117 U. PA. L. REV. 734, 741 (1969).
76. Civil No. 225-72 (D.D.C., filed Feb. 3, 1972). For the text of the complaint,
see [1971-1972 Transfer Binder] CCH FED. SEc. L. REP. ff 93,360.
77. The law firms charged were White & Case (New York), representatives of
NSMC since 1968; and Lord, Bissell & Brook (Chicago), representatives of an NSMC
subsidiary since 1952. [1971-1972 Transfer Binder] CCH FED. SEC. L. REP. 1 93,360,
at 91,913-3.
78. As a condition of the merger presented in the proxy statement, the law firms
were required to issue an opinion stating that all steps had been validly taken to
consummate the merger and that no state or federal statute had been violated to the
law firms' knowledge. Although the law firms had received information from the
accounting firm that had prepared the financial statements that those financial state-
ments included in the proxy materials were inaccurate, they nevertheless issued the
opinion letter. [1971-1972 Transfer Binder] CCH FED. SEC. L. RaP. f 93,360, at 91,
913-16 to 17. The SEC alleged that the firms had violated, directly, and indirectly
as aiders and abettors, the proxy provision of the Exchange Act, section 14(a), 15
U.S.C. § 78(m) (a) (1970), and rule lOb-5, when shareholders of the target company
exchanged their shares for shares in NSMC. [1971-1972 Transfer Binder] CCH
FED. SEc. L. REP. 93,360, at 93,913-15.
79. [1971-1972 Transfer Binder] CCH FaD. SEc. L. RaP. 93,360, at 91,913-17.
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the assertion has been made that most attorneys do not expect to be held
accountable for their written opinions.80
The trend toward applying a negligence standard to all defendants has
been acknowledged and supported by commentators and courts alike.8'
Certainly, since Texas Gulf Sulphur the negligence test has been held suffi-
cient for enforcement actions,8 2 and some circuits apparently consider it to
be sufficient in private actions.8 3 If the NSMC guidelines for attorney con-
duct as set forth by the SEC were to be consistently enforced, the only
uncertainty which would remain would lie within the traditional concept of
the attorney-client privilege. It is questionable whether the duty to report
violations of the securities laws to the SEC would constitute a breach of
that confidential relationship.8 4 However, if it were made known exactly
what conduct was expected under the SEC provisions, and such conduct
were consistently exhibited and approved, uncertainty would no longer be
a problem, even under the attorneys' ABA Code of Professional Responsi-
bility."5 Adherence to the requirements of the SEC expressed in NSMC,
80. Corso, Opinions of Counsel: Responsibilities & Liabilities, 17 CLEV.-MAR.L. REV. 375 (1968). See also Karmel, Attorneys' Securities Laws Liabilities, 27
Bus. LAW. 1153 (1972), questioning the SEC's attempts at having private attorneys
act as securities law enforcers.
If the SEC's position in NSMC is upheld by the courts, it may result in more
attorneys, particularly those not associated with a large firm, hesitating to undertake
any securities work. Not to escape the pressure, the larger firm still willing to work
in the securities field will see its malpractice insurance rates substantially increase.
81. See, e.g., Scienter and Rule 10b-5. 69 COLUM. L. REV. 1057 (1969); Com-
ment, Negligent Misrepresentations Under Rule 10b-5, 32 U. CHI. L. REV. 824 (1965).
See notes 56 & 66 and accompanying text supra.
82. See note 56 and accompanying text supra.
83. See notes 32-40 and accompanying text supra.
84. A recent decision of the Second Circuit suggests that such disclosure would
not be a breach of professional ethics. In Meyerhofer v. Empire Fire and Marine Ins.
Co., 497 F.2d 1190 (2d Cir.), cert. denied, 95 S. Ct. 314 (1974), an attorney resigned
from his firm because of a dispute over whether to disclose in the registration state-
ment an excessive fee arrangement between the firm and the issuer it was representing.
The attorney reported his objections concerning the registration statement to the SEC,
and subsequently, upon discovering that he was a defendant in a suit by Meyerhofer,
a purchaser of the issuer's stock, gave the same information to the plaintiff's attorneys
to demonstrate his lack of culpability in the matter. 497 F.2d at 1193. The court held
that by making these disclosures, the attorney was not in breach of Canons 4 and 9
of the ABA CODE OF PROFESSIONAL RESPONSIBILITY, because under Disciplinary Rule
4-101 he was entitled to reveal "'[clonfidences or secrets necessary . . . to defend
himself.., against an accusation of wrongful conduct'." 497 F.2d at 1195, quoting ABA
CODE OF PROFESSIONAL RESPONSIBILITY D.R. 4-101 (c) (4). The attorney was, however,
prohibited from acting as an attorney for a party in any action which should arisefrom the facts and circumstances he disclosed, and from further revealing this or any
other information except upon discovery or at trial. Id. at 1196.
85. Disciplinary Rule 4-101 provides, in pertinent part:
A lawyer may reveal . . .(2) Confidences or secrets when permitted under Disciplinary Rules
or required by law or court order.(3) The intention of his client to commit a crime and the information
necessary to prevent the crime.ABA CODE OF PROFESSIONAL RESPONSIBILITY D.R. 4-101 (emphasis added). Disci-
plinary Rule 7-102(B) must also be complied with.
A lawyer who receives information clearly establishing that:(1) His client has, in the course of the representation, perpetrated
a fraud upon a person or tribunal shall promptly call upon his
client to rectify the same, and if his client refuses or is unable
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